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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY CAMBRIDGE 39, MASS.

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS

Deve Major Googjean, I have weitten, RAND concerning the machine description. This was, handwritten and was sent to NSA late last springs I believe, or sent to someone there. Essentially the same was once machine description communication sent to a Navy communication center in Washington, I think.

Center in Washington, I think.

Machine discussed the general theory general expanential conjecture with R.C.

Rland of the R.C. Blanchfield and A.M. Gleason who have worked for NSA. Recently a conversation with Prof. Hoffman here indicated that he has recently been working that he has machine with similar objectives. Since he will be consulting For NSA I shall

discuss my ideas with him. He has developed minimal redundancy coding wethods.

I hope my handwriting, etc. do not give the impression I am just a crank or circle-squarer. My position here is Assist. Rolf. of math. My best known work to is In game theory (reprint sent separately). I mention these things only in the interest of securing a most careful consideration of the machine and ideas by your most competent associates. does not tern up. I will be prepare another. Also I shall be happy to provide any additional information pro assures any queries to the best of my ability. prompt reply, I am Sincerely Yours, Jahn Hoch

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

CAMBRIDGE 39, MASS.

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS

letter concerns ENCIPHERING

Dear Sirs:

by a function

An enciphering-deciphering machine Cin general outline) of my invention has been sent to your organization by way of the RAND corporation. In this letter I make some remarks on a general principle relevant to encuphring in general and to my machine in posticulos. This pronciple seems quite impostant to me and I have some reason to believe you may not be fully awase of it. with a finite "key", operationing on binary messages . Specifically, we can assure the process described

Where the d's, x's, and y's one mod 2 and where if xis is changed, with the other x's and left fixed then yi is changed.

The as denote the "key". 12 Containing & bits of information.

n is the spen maximum spon of the inemony" of the process. If n were or the assuments given below would not be basically altered. To consider the resistance of an enciphering process to being broken we should assure that at same times the enemy knows everything but the key being used and to break it need only discover the key from this intermation.

We see immediately that in principle the enemy needs very little information to begin to break down the process. Essentially, as soon as a bits of enciptived message have been tours mitted the key is about determined. This is no security, for a practical key should not be too long. But this does not consider how easy, it is for the enemy to make the computation determining the key. If this computation

, although possible in pinciple, were l sufficiently long at best then the process could still be secure in a porter practical susense. The most direct computation proceedure would be for the enemy to try all 25 possible keys, one by one. Obviously this is easily made impractical for the enemy by simply choosing or bage enough. In many cruder types of encuphering particulosy those which are not auto-coding, such as substitution ciphers [letter for letter, letter pair for letter pour, toiple for teiple.] shorts means her computang the key are feasible, essentially because the key can be determined piece meal, one substitution at a time. enciphesing processes is by the way for the way has the computation tength reight for the computation of the key Increases with increasing tength length of the key. This is at best experential

small power of s, are or are as in substitution aphers. Now my general conjecture is as follows: For almost all sufficiently complex types of enciphering, especially the where the throsmation instructions given by different partions of the key interact complexly with each other in the determination of their ultimate effects on the ent enciphaing, the man key computation length increases expenentially with the length of the key, or in other words, with the information content of the key. The significance of this general conjecture, assuming its touth, is easy to see. It means that It is quite feasible to design ciphes that are effectively inbreakable As ciphes, become more sophisticated the game of cipher breaking by skilled teams, etc., should become a thing of the past.

The nature of this conjecture is L's such that I cannot prove it, ever for a special type of ciphs. Nos do I expect it to be proven. But this does not destroy its signifiance. The probability of the touth of the conjecture can be guessed at on the basis of experience with enciphering and deaphering believe in the exponential conjecture the I think we (the U.S.) can not afford not to make use of it. Also we should try to keep toack of the inbreakable" types of ciphess. Since the U.S. presumably does not want other nations to use ciphers we cannot expect to break, this general principle should probably be studied but to kept secret. I believe the enciphering deciphring machine I invented and had transmitted

to the N.S.A. VIa RAND has this imbreakable" property. In addition it has several other advantages in that the some physical machine would function both for ciphesing and deciphesing and that it is auto-synchronizing and recovers after isolated errors in toursmission. Those properties are not typical of enuphring systems which are auto-coding. Also it is suitable for iall electronic, ultra rapid, embodyment.

answer to this letter, yet it would be nice to have some sost of answer. I would be happy to explain more fully any thing which is not clear in my letter, or to amplify on 1t.

I have been toeating my ideas as information deserving some secrecy precautions, yet I feel it is important to communicate them to the right people. I hope the material in this letter can obtain prompt consideration by very highly competent men, versed in Sincerely, John Wash John Wash Asst. Prof. Math.

Mr. John Nash
Department of Mathematics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Nash:

Your recent letter, received January 1955, is noted.

Technicans at this Agency recall a very interesting discussion with you which took place approximately four years ago, and will welcome the opportunity to examine your ideas on the subject of cryptography.

A check within this Agency has, unfortunately, disclosed no information on your machine. A description of the principles involved will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

cc: AG C/S COMSEC (3) 412

E.M. Gibson Lt. Col., AGC Assistant Adi. Gen.

M/R: In Jan 1955, Mr. Nash offered general remarks on cryptography and requested evaluation of descriptive material which he had forwarded through Rand Corp. NSA Ser 236, 12 Jan 55 informed Mr. Nash that the material had not arrived. Mr. Nash in letter rec'd 18 Jan 55 states the material was sent to NSA and to a Navy Communication Center in Wash. late last spring. A check of Agency records and discussions with various individuals (R/D mathematicians and persons who might have had contact with Rand Corp.) within the Agency has undovered nothing concerning the system. This correspondence requests a description of the machine.

In 1950 Mr. Nash submitted material, in interview, which was evaluated by NSA as not suitable.

M. A. Lyons, 4128, 60372, in

3) 40/2-2-2

Serial: 236 12 JAN 1955

Mr. John Nash Department of Mathematics Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Nash:

Reference is made to your recent letter concerning enciphering processes. The information regarding the general principles has been noted with interest. It will be considered fully, and particularly in connection with your enciphering-deciphering machine.

The description of your machine has not yet been received from the Rand Corporation. As soon as details are received, the machine will be studied to determine whether it is of interest to the Government.

The presentation for appraisal of your ideas for safeguarding communications security is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

cc: AG C/S COMSEC (3) C.M. GROSJEAN
MAJOR WAC
Actg. Asst. Adjutent General

M/R: Mr. Nash offers remarks on a general principle relevant to enciphering in general and to his machine in particular. The machine, which he is sending via the Rand Corporation, has not yet been received.

This letter informs Mr. Nash that his remarks are being noted and that the machine will be studied as soon as details are received. This reply coordinated with Mr. M. M. Mathews, NSA-31. This is an

interim reply.

M. A. Lypus M. A. Lypus, 4128, 60372, in



E.M. Gibson, Lt. Col., AGC, Asst. Adj. Gren. DEOE SIT: Here is a description of my enciphering - deciphering machine. Cle CIP! 28 mutation P PermuterReverser Adder
mod 2 Choose Transmitting Arrangement R D P aut pu deciphored Receiving Arrangement 1

In the receiving arrangement the some components ore used except for the addition of the retorder, which is a one-onit delay. The messages ore to be sequences of binosy digits (numbers mod 2). The machines work on a cycling basis, performing certain operations

During each cycle.

During each cycle the adder A, takes

11 two digits and adds them and

sends on the sum obtained from the

previous addition. The delay in this


addition necessitates the retorder R

The permutes will be described in more detail below. It takes in a digit from D during each cycle and also puts out a number. What it does, which is the choice between two permutations is determined by what digit (1 or 0) is in D at the time. The permutes always how a digit of always how a digit of always and takes in a digit from D.

In operation the input of the receiver is the output of the transmitter. So the input to R is the same as the input to D in the transmitter. Hence the output of P in the receiver is the same as the out-put of P in the receiver in the transmitter, except for a one-

unit lag.

So the adds A in the receiver gets: (1) the out put of A in the toansmitter, and (2) the previous input from Persons.) to A(trons). Now Since binosy addition is the same as binasy subtraction (i.e. + 4 - mod) ore the same) the output of Afreceing will be the previous input to A(trans.) from the input to the toans mitter, i.e. It will be the clear or unciphered message. The permuter, P, and "decider", D. work as follows, Illustrated by example:



The cicles represent places where a digit can be stored. During each cycle either the red permutation of digits or the blue takes place. This is decided by the digit in D at the beginning of the cycle. The D digit moves to the first circle or storage place in P during the cycle after it has determined the choice of the permutation.

Both promutations should cycle through all the places in P, so that a digit would be corried to through all of them and out under 1ts action alone.

In addition to moving digits around the permutations can change at 1's to 0's and v.v. For example

represents a shift of the digit in the left circle to the right with this change

 The "key" for the enciphering (5) machine is the choice of the permutations. If there are negatives may not counting storage points in P, not counting the first one, which receives the digit from D, then there are

[n! 2n+1]2 possible teys.

people to check on the possession of this machine of the various proporties I claimed for it in a previous letter. I hope the correspondence I have sent in receives coreful affention from the most qualified people, because I think the basic points involved are very important.

P.S. Various devices could be added to the machine, but I think it would gereally selm Mosh we better to enlose the permuter Assist Root. Mathematical adjunction of course as correcting coding could occasionally be a useful adjunct.

Serial: 3 MAR 1955 Mr. John Nash Department of Mathematics Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge 39, Massachusetts Dear Mr. Nash: Reference is made to your letter received in this Agency on 17 February 1955. The system which you describe has been very carefully examined for possible application to military and other government use. It has been found that the cryptographic principles involved in your system, although ingenious, do not meet the necessary security requirements for official application. Unfortunately it is impossible to discuss any details in this letter. Perhaps in the future another opportunity will arise for discussion of your ideas on the subject of cryptography. Although your system cannot be adopted, its presentation for appraisal and your generosity in offering it for official use are very much appreciated. It is regretted that a more favorable reply cannot be given. Sincerely. E.M. Gibson Lt. Col., AGC Assistant Adj. Gen. COMSEC (3) 412 (M/R ATTACHED)

M/R: In Jan 55 Mr. Nash offered general remarks on cryptography and requested evaluation of descriptive material which he had forwarded through Rand Corp. The Material was not received from Rand Corp. Dr. Campaigne received a letter from Mr. Nash inclosing a copy of the letter (5 Apr 54) from Rand which transmitted this material to NSA. This material was found in R/D files. In the meantime Mr. Nash sent a handwritten description of his enciphering-deciphering machine.

Mr. Nash proposes a permuting cipher-text auto-key principle which has many of the desirable features of a good auto-key system; but it affords only limited security, and requires a comparatively large amount of equipment. The principle would not be used alone in its present form and suitable modification or extension is considered unlikely, unless it could be used in conjunction with other good auto-key principles.

This correspondence informs Mr. Nash that his system does not meet necessary security requirements; and expresses pleasure at the thought of an opportunity to discuss Mr. Nash's ideas on cryptography again. Such a discussion took place in 1950 when Mr. Nash submitted material, in interview, which was evaluated by NSA as unsuitable.

An interesting pamphlet on Non-Cooperative Games, written by Mr. Nash was also sent to this Agency by the author for our information

Dr. Campaigne has been informed that the reply has been written and is not interested in further coordination.

A fyour MALY of 5, 4128/60372/rwb